Finding ways to tame the new giant

The main element driving security development in North Asia is the rapid pace of China ‘s strategic force modernisation. This is increasing insecurity in Japan and Taiwan , with unpredictable consequences. And while Australia has an enormous stake in the outcome, we have few means of being able to influence events.

The intentions of a rising China are not hard to discern. China’s version of the Monroe Doctrine (expressed by US president James Monroe in 1823, it demanded that European powers should get out and stay out of North and South America) involves pushing the US out of East Asia and keeping Japan down.

What is harder to predict is how the other key players will react. The US has no intention of letting China push it out of East Asia , while Japan has no intention of being kept down.

It is always hard to manage the rise of another great power. In the past, the rise of a great power has nearly always led to war.

Of course, China did not suddenly become powerful when the Cold War ended. Rather, it has been getting unprecedented strategic latitude as a consequence of the collapse of Soviet power and the fact that Russia is now finished as a great power.

The US will have the main burden of trying to bring China peacefully into the international system, by means that do not amount to appeasement. That is not going to be easy.

In China , a Leninist regime is now using capitalism as a weapon because Deng Xiaoping set China on this path in 1978. But Deng’s successors do not enjoy his authority. That makes them more inclined to play the nationalist card as economic and social tensions rise. And they are disregarding Deng’s sensible advice against threatening either Taiwan or Japan .

There are several flash points in North Asia : the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait and the contested islands of the East China Sea . The Cold War ended without these issues being resolved, so they soon re-emerged, albeit with different twists. And they all play into one another in complex ways.

For example, North Korea ‘s dangerous nuclear brinkmanship has made the Japanese public aware of the need for missile defence. And although North Korea (like South Korea ) is China ‘s quasi-ally, China has not been able to control North Korea , or to prevent it from acting in ways contrary to China ‘s interests, not least in relation to Japan .

Japan , in order to gain protection from North Korean (and Chinese) missiles, must join a US-led global system. Co-operation in missile defence is rapidly consolidating the US-Japan alliance. Moreover, US-Japan military interoperability is proceeding apace. And Japan is moving military assets southwards as a response to the growing strategic pressure it feels from China ‘s rapid force modernisation.

Taiwan is also a wildcard. Given the collision of Sino-US interest, miscalculation could easily lead to war in the Taiwan Strait . Taiwan ‘s ruling Democratic Progressive Party was soundly beaten in recent local elections, raising the fear that President Chen Shui-bian might move closer to radical independence advocates. China ‘s rapid build-up of missiles that threaten Taiwan , as well as maritime assets pointed at US aircraft carriers, are also rattling Taiwan .

These security problems will not be resolved by dialogue or by creating new regional organisations like the East Asia Summit. That is because the issues are not based on simple misunderstanding. The only solution is a regime in Beijing willing to share power, and thus more willing to respect the rights and interests of others. The big question is how to get from here to there.

For Australia , China does not represent the threat of invasion, as Japan did in 1941. Nor does it possess the huge military power once commanded by the USSR when it stretched across Eurasia , threatening US allies at both ends.

Rather, the threat is to our national independence. If China were to become East Asia ‘s hegemonic power, especially if it still had a Leninist government, we could make no decisions in foreign policy without first considering what Beijing ‘s reaction would be. The incidents involving Chinese defectors in 2005 were a reminder to Australians that the regime in Beijing expects the Chinese diaspora in Australia , as elsewhere, to respect Bejiing’s interests.

Our alliance with the US is not free of costs or risks either. Alliances never are. Nor are they automatic guarantees of commitment in all circumstances. Along with the security benefits they provide come risks and costs for both parties. Classically, these involve the risk of entanglement. But no country could attack Australia , or our vital interests anywhere in the world, without calculating America ‘s likely response. Thus our interests are best served by doing whatever we can to keep the regional balance tilted in our favour, by ensuring a continued US presence.

In South-East Asia , we can bring to bear our military and diplomatic resources, including longstanding defence connections. At the recent East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur , Prime Minister John Howard deftly helped Japan , Singapore and others in stopping China from hijacking the process.

But our ability to influence events in North Asia is limited. Our main means of tilting the balance in our favour is the strengthening of our security connections with the US and Japan .

Robyn Lim is professor of international relations at Nanzan University, Japan, and a visiting fellow at The Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney .