Lightweight response to army’s role

The new Defence Minister, Brendan Nelson, is being told the Australian Army should be composed mainly of light infantry. That is snake oil. Such an approach would undermine our capabilities close to home while reducing our ability to operate with the forces of our major ally.

Light infantry are called light because they have relatively little equipment. They are highly mobile, in the sense that they can be flown quickly to distant locations. But once on the ground, they are reduced to walking speed unless they can take lots of helicopters with them.

Moreover, light infantry have no protection such as tanks or armoured transportation and are severely disadvantaged when fighting enemies equipped with armour.

We need to “harden” the army even for operations in the inner arc of islands close to our northern shores. These days, even guerillas and criminals can get hold of heavy weapons that can kill large numbers of lightly armed infantry.

Those who advocate an army mostly composed of light infantry are also saying we should reduce our ability to operate with United States forces. The US Army is moving away from light infantry to forces that are still highly mobile but have more protection. If Australia cannot bring armour – tanks, for example – and significant firepower to future fights, the Australian Defence Force will become less attractive to the US for coalition warfare. And while maritime and air power often provide the keys to victory, the essential nature of warfare will not change. That is because muddy boots on the ground, where people live, will always be needed.

For Australia , the main value of the US alliance is that no country could contemplate attacking us, or our vital interests, without contemplating how America would respond. And because we live in an uncertain region, this assurance means we have continued to spend relatively little on defence – still less than 2 per cent of gross domestic product.

It is true we don’t have to do everything the US wants us to do.

It is also true America does not have to do everything we want it to do. Who can forget that in the early days of our East Timor intervention, our capabilities were so deficient that we were demanding American muddy boots on the ground. And that was after decades of so-called defence self-reliance.

The hardened and networked army is just part of the ADF’s greater emphasis on strategic mobility. The new medium-sized amphibious ships and the maritime forces needed to protect force-projection capabilities are also part of the package.

Those who advocate a strategy based on light infantry are continuing an approach based on defence self-reliance that has muddled our strategic thinking and crippled our force structure for decades. Times have changed and we need to move on.

Robyn Lim is professor of international relations at Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan, and a visiting fellow at The Centre for Independent Studies.